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ON LIARS, LOGIC, AND LINGUISTS 
by David Thomas 
Epi::Jenides the Cretan said, "Al.1 Cretans are liars. 11 And 
he had been one-upped already 700 years previously by King 
David, who said, 11Al.1 =1en are liars. 11 30th of' t:-iese paradoxes 
are cle::.Jonstra'!:ly nornal non-paradoxical state!-~ents in Greek, 
Hebrew, a.'"ld Eng1is3.1.. And it would seer..1 tl:.at :;1any other 
logical paradoxes can probably also be s:':lol'm to !~e linguistic-
ally either unnatural or non;-paradoxica1. 
1) General logic ap::,ears to deal nainly or solely with dis-
crete entities and quantities, and linb"~istics has painted it-
self into q~ite a f'ew corners in foll.owi~g s~it. I f'eel t~at 
it would. be better in discussins languages to tall: in ter::.1s of' 
distinct but not discrete entities, in terms of' clear nucl.ei 
and fading-off' or fuzzy peripheries, with frequent peripheral. 
overlap and indeter::linac ie s in phonol.ogy, gra:.:.t:::ar, a....,d secan-
tic s. Only t~e foci (or peaks) are contrastive. T2is in turn 
leads to degrees of truth or falsehooc in naturel languages. 
Liars and truth-tellers thus are not sharply contrasting 
sets of' people, but one r.iay be known as a liar f'ro:J telling 
only one untruth, t~oug~ he tells the tr-~th all the rest of 
the ti::.1e, and one ::1ay be known as a truth-tel.ler, though he 
tells only part of' t:1e truth, not the w::.ole. Tl1.e se=iantic 
nuclei of' 'liar' and 'truth-teller' are distinct and contrast-
ive, but do not indicate whether specific state!:1ents are lies 
or truth. 
2) General logic seldo~:1 recognizes or uses gra::.rr.1atic2.1 rules 
above sentence level. Linguistics re~uires t~e for::1ulation of 
rules on up to the discourse level, includi~g ellipsis and 
intonation rules. 
Apparently para,.doxical state::.ients thus can often be recon-
ciled by calling on paragrapl1 or c'iscourse require:c1ents to show 
their non-parz.c:o:;dcc:..l or else non-gra::r_:a.tical c~aracter. note 
the discourse req:..1ire~.1e:.1ts i:n the :following: 
"I ar..1 lying. 11 This as a total uttera:1ce would be 
unnatural i:n English; perhaps we co;_;:_lc: say it is no::1-
co::z:iunication or nonsense, because in English .Lying is a 
1:.1arker or a Response utterance w~icc requires a verbal ante-
cedent. It requires an i~ediately preceding or surrounding 
state:z1ent to w!-::.ich it re:fers and resarc.i:;:1g ,1h.ic:.1 it is a 
value juc;g1:1ent. It requires co::1pletion ( overt or covert) in 
sone such f'oro as 11 I arn lying wl1.en I say that ••• 11 , just as, 




"You are lying. ai This is cor.won as a total utterance, 
but it reqt.1.ires an ir.1.-:1ediately previous assertion by a 
different speaker, This sentence can be· a total utterance, 
but not a total discourse, 
HI we.s lying when I se.id t~1.at ti • • • Th.is is nor=ial. 
11 I will lie to hil:l." T::e S"..lbject catter of' tl-:e pro-
posed lie :i:rust nor:::1ally be in the context. 
"I am telling the truth. 11 
tion by a previous assertion, 
value judg-.::.1ent. 
This also requires co::ple-
on 1·1::.ic:: t:-:is state::::ent is a 
Similar to these are sentences such as "Why?" or "I know.", 
wl:.ich require co::1.pletior. by e. previous statenent, i. e. they 
are bound respo~se forns, not free assert~o~ fores. And this 
brings us back to our paradoxes: 
11 Wh.at I a=. seyi:.g now is false." If' tl~is is said in 
total isolation wit~ nothing either cefore or after it, the 
natural 3nglis~-speaki~g listener's rcs?onse, after a pause 
waiting for the e:r..pected assertion to be ::1ade, woulc be, 
"But you didn 1-t say anything. 11 T:;.~e gramn1atically required 
co:.1pletion or resulution was absent. 
Similarly wi t:1. state::uents like at 4: J5 sayi:1g, "llb..at I say at 
4:J5 is f'alse. 11 T:.1.ey lack the req:iired (stated. or obtainable) 
cor..::.pletion. T::e si::1plest for::'.! of co:..::pletio;: wo..::.ld be, "I a::.1 
lying when I say •• , 11 This type of' cor.:1pletion when applied to 
state;-_ients such. as the foregoL,g can lead to m."lconpletable 
i::1:t'ini te regress as "I a.:.1 lyi:i.1g w:1en I say t::at I az:1 lying 
w:1.en I say tl:c:t I ar;.1 lying when ••• 11 , w::ic:-: is obvio1-!sly 
unaccepta1:'le as an 3nglisi.1. sentence. T:_-:is anc. sinilar 
parado::::::.es are clearly not natural ~:nglis::-.:. w::.1.en seen in this 
light. 
~ R 11 1 • t " t . 1 • · l · ~ Per.1.'laps 1 usse s in u.i ion, ·w.:::ic 1. is souna, ce.n be re-
1Russell, :aertrand. .A.-:i Inaui_IT ir..to Meaning ancl Trl.lth. 
New York: ·w. U. Norton & C~ny, 1 9Zi'.o. 
stated to say that in languages (not "in languaf:e") :::::iany 
words have syntactic requirenents a.-id restrictio1:s. Uords 
wit~ no syntactic require~ents can stanc alone ~reely as 
single word. discourses ( these are ::_1ostly e::::::cla::.1ation words). 
Hany other words require thc,t t~1ere i:>e a clause ::.:,resent or in 
ellipsis {::1ost of' our nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs 
wo".!ld fit here, i.e. :-.1ost of' Russell's ol.:ject ·words). Soae 
other words require the presence of two claases (~ostly 
conjunctions, :1ence :.!a.."rly of' Russell's lo.;-ice..J_ words). A few 
other words req~ire the presence of an additional utterance 
in :full, in elli?sis, or in e::Jl.:edding ( words li:.:.e tru.e, f'als-e, 
lying, wl'ly?) • 
T:::1us invokic"lG: higher-level gra: ::·.:atical r-..:.les we can nain-
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tain that a lan{;,"1.la(;e is basically a sinc;le unity l-Ti th a 
single set of' rules. What we learn f'rom Russell and the 1:1.ar 
is not so r.tu.ch the need f'or saying that EnGlish is an in~inite 
set o:f dif':fercnt languac-cs, but the need for recoGni~dng the 
i!:1portance o:f sta tinc; the syntactic require;:1cnts of' "l·mrds as 
part of' their basic description, alone uit:1 the :for::1, the 
1:1eaninG, the lexical co-occurrences, and tiic syntactic slot 
cupabili ty. Ui t:1 t::is factor in ::1i11C:., one co,_:ld not t:1en 
say in EnGlisll in isolation, "I at:t lyinc, 11 
And witl1 t:w rccocnition tl1at in ~11Glisl1 all does not 
always 1:1ean 'every', and that ll.§!£ doon not 1:1ean 1 n.1"1·1ays 
lyinc', one can t:1cn say honestly, linc;u.istically, logically, 
and non-paradoxically, "All 1-:1en are liara ,. 11 
David z~o::1as 
Sur.r::1er Insti. tt.1.te o:f Linguistics 
CORDS/REF/VOLAG 
AFO San Fra~cisco, Calif. ·96243 
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